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SUBCHAPTER S Loss LIMITATION: THE
EFFECT OF SHAREHOLDER LOAN
GUARANTEES ON BASIS
by Richard H Stamps
PON incorporation of a small business, many shareholders elect taxation under the provisions of subchapter S of the Internal Revenue
Code. I The well-known, partnership-like provisions of subchapter S
allow tax items of the S corporation to pass through to the shareholder, who
then personally reports his or her pro rata share of the tax items. The obvious advantage of this pass-through of tax items is that the shareholder may
immediately deduct on a personal tax return operating losses of the corporation that, absent the subchapter S election, would remain inside the corporation awaiting potential carryback to past taxable years or carryover to future
years. 2 In this respect, the pass-through provisions of subchapter S greatly
appeal to shareholders seeking improvement in short-term cash flow. The
Code, however, limits the pass-through of losses and deductions to the sum
of the shareholder's adjusted tax basis in the S corporation stock and the
shareholder's tax basis in the indebtedness of the S corporation to the shareholder.3 Shareholders, therefore, have a keen interest in generating sufficient
basis in both of these items.
When an S corporation seeks financing, lenders frequently require that the
corporate shareholders personally guarantee the corporate debt. Shareholders have long argued that such a guarantee serves to increase the shareholders' adjusted tax basis in the corporation, and thereby allows a larger passthrough of losses and deductions. Courts, however, have uniformly held
that shareholder loan guarantees generate no additional basis in indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder. 4 A few decisions have stated that
the guarantee might increase the basis of the shareholder's stock if the guari. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (1986). Id. § 1362(a)(1) provides that a small business corporation may elect S corporation status. A small business corporation for subchapter S purposes is
defined as a corporation having no more than 35 shareholders, no nonindividual shareholders,
no nonresident alien shareholders, and no more than one class of stock. Id. § 1361(b)(1). For
a detailed discussion of the requirements for subchapter S status see J. EUSTICE & J. KuNTz,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS ch. 3 (rev. ed. 1985).

2. A corporation taxed under subchapter C must currently carry net operating losses
back three years and forward 15 years. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1986). The corporate net
operating loss provisions differ only slightly from those of individuals. See id. § 172(d)(2)-(6).
3. Id. § 1366(d)(1).
4. See cases cited infra note 47. For a discussion of guarantee law see Borg v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 257, 264-65 (1968); Perry v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 159, 163-64 (1966); 38 AM.
JUR. 2D Guaranty §§ 1-25 (1968 & Supp. 1986).

1241

1242

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

antee in substance constitutes a loan from the bank followed by a shareholder contribution to the corporation's capital. 5 In no cases, however, did
an S corporation shareholder prevail using this substance over form
argument.
In December 1985 the Eleventh Circuit decided a case that may have
changed the rules of the game. In Selfe v. United States6 the court held that
a shareholder loan guarantee results in an increase in the basis of either the
stock or the indebtedness of the S corporation to the shareholder upon a
factual determination that the lender looked primarily to the shareholder for
repayment. 7 After explaining the legal background of the subchapter S operating loss limitation and case law dealing with shareholder loan guarantees, this Comment discusses Selfe and the issues raised in that case. This
Comment then argues in favor of allowing an increased basis in an S corporation when shareholders personally guarantee corporate debt, if certain
conditions are met. Finally, this Comment proposes an amendment to the
Internal Revenue Code that would allow S corporation shareholders to increase their basis in the corporation when they personally guarantee corporate debt.
I.

LIMITATION ON THE PASS-THROUGH OF LOSSES AND DEDUCTIONS

Many small business corporations elect taxation under the provisions of
subchapter S of the Code in order to obtain a pass-through of tax items from
the corporation to the shareholders. Under section 1366(a)(1) of the Code a
subchapter S shareholder's portion of the corporation's tax liability is determined by taking into account the shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's separately computed items and the corporation's nonseparately
computed income or loss.8 Separately computed items are items of income,
loss, deduction, or credit flowing to and reported by the shareholder on an
item-by-item basis. 9 Nonseparately computed items constitute a hotchpot of
5.
6.
7.
8.

See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
778 F.2d 769 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 775.
I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1986) provides:
(a) Determination of shareholder's tax liability.
(1) In general. In determining the tax under this chapter of a shareholder for the
shareholder's taxable year in which the taxable year of the S corporation ends (or
for the final taxable year of a shareholder who dies before the end of the corporation's taxable year), there shall be taken into account the shareholder's pro rata
share of the corporation's(A) items of income (including tax-exempt income), loss, deduction, or credit
the separate treatment of which could affect the liability for tax of any shareholder, and
(B) nonseparately computed income or loss.
For purposes of the preceeding sentence, the items referred to in subparagraph (A)
shall include amounts described in paragraph (4) or (6) of section 702(a).
(2) Nonseparately computed income or loss defined. For purposes of this subchapter, the term "nonseparately computed income or loss" means gross income
minus the deductions allowed to the corporation under this chapter, determined by
excluding all items described in paragraph (1)(A).
9. See id. § 1366(a)(1).
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residual items escaping separate treatment.10 This provision has the effect of
taxing S corporation shareholders in a manner similar to the taxation of
partners under subchapter K of the Code, I' since a shareholder determines
items that are separately computed by partial reference to partnership tax
provisions in the Code. 12 Section 1366(a)(2) provides that the character of
all items passed through to shareholders have the same character as if the
shareholder realized the item directly from the source from which the corpo3
ration realized the item.'
Section 1366(d)(1) limits the pass-through of losses and deductions to the
shareholder for any taxable year to the sum of the shareholder's adjusted
basis in stock and the shareholder's basis in any indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder.14 This limitation provision formerly existed in section 1374(c)(2). The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, however, shifted
the limitation to section 1366(d)(1), 15 effective January 1, 1983.16 Thus,
most of the case law dealing with basis as it relates to shareholder loan guarantees refers to former section 1374.
Prior to the enactment of the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, an S
corporation shareholder whose pro rata share of losses exceeded the loss
limitation lost the deduction forever. ' 7 This rule resulted in a harsh trap for
shareholders whose typically unsuccessful efforts to generate basis by guaranteeing corporate debt resulted in the permanent relinquishment of the unused loss.' 8 Had such shareholders known the potential consequences, they
could have personally borrowed money and then advanced the funds to the
corporation, thereby qualifying for basis generation on the face of the statute. Congress, in an attempt to mitigate traps of this variety, added section
1366(d)(2) in the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 to allow shareholders
an indefinite carryover to subsequent taxable years of losses and deductions
10. See id. § 1366(a)(2).
11. Id. §§ 701-761.
12. Id. § 1366(a)(1). Section 702, referenced in id. § 1366(a)(1), provides for the separate
and nonseparate computation of partnership items. Accordingly, tax items that the S corporation shareholder separately computes essentially parallel those items computed separately by
partners. For a discussion of the items that are computed separately see I. GRANT, SUBCHAPTER S TAXATION § 16.4 (rev. ed. 1986).
13. I.R.C. § 1366(b) (1986).
14. Id. § 1366(d)(1) provides:
(d) Special rules for losses and deductions.
(1) Cannot exceed shareholder's basis in stock and debt. The aggregate amount
of losses and deductions taken into account by a shareholder under subsection (a)
for any taxable year shall not exceed the sum of(A) the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock in the S corporation (determined with regard to paragraph (1) of section 1367(a) for the taxable year), and
(B) the shareholder's adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the S corporation to
the shareholder (determined without regard to any adjustment under paragraph
(2) of section 1367(b) for the taxable year).
15. Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 2, 96 Stat. 1669, 1677-79.
16. Id. § 6, 96 Stat. at 1697.
17. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2632, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5053, 5072; S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in
1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4791, 4877.
18. See S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3253, 3258.
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in excess of the loss limitation. 19
In spite of Congress's effort to make S corporation provisions more like
20
partnership provisions by allowing a carryover of losses and deductions,
important differences remain between the provisions with respect to loss limitations. One example is the treatment of liabilities of the entity. Under
sections 752(a) and 722, an increase in a partner's share of partnership liabilities results in an increased basis in the partner's interest in the partnership.2 1 Subchapter S contains no similar provision. This conceptual
of losses to partners than their S
difference often results in larger deductions
22
corporation shareholder counterparts.
A.

Basis of Stock

A shareholder's adjusted tax basis in an S corporation's stock forms part
of the limitation on the pass-through of losses and deductions. Subchapter S
contains no provisions specifying how a shareholder initially determines
stock basis. Presumably, other applicable provisions of the Code determine
the initial stock basis. For example, purchased stock has a cost basis under
section 1012,23 inherited stock has a basis equal to the fair market value of
the stock at the date of the decedent's death under section 1014,24 stock
acquired by gift has the donor's carryover basis under section 1015,25 and
stock received as compensation has a basis of the fair market value at the
time of receipt under section 83.26
However basis is initially determined, section 1367(a)(1) provides that the
stock basis increases by the sum of all separately computed items of income
(including tax-exempt income), nonseparately computed income, and excess
depletion deductions. 27 The income items increase stock basis only to the
extent that they are included in the shareholder's personal gross income. 28
Section 1367(a)(2) states that several items decrease a shareholder's stock
basis. 29 These items include corporate distributions not included in the income of the shareholder by virtue of section 1368,30 and separately and non19. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2) (1986).
20. See S. REP. No. 640, supra note 18, at 6, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
3258.

21. I.R.C. § 752(a) (1986) treats the liability as a contribution of money or property by
the partner. Id. Section 722 provides that a partner's basis increases upon a contribution of
money or property. Id. § 722.

22. I. GRANT, supra note 12, § 18.3, at 18-8.
23. I.R.C. § 1012 (1986); see Byrne v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 151, 154 (1965), aff'd, 361
F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1966).
24. I.R.C. § 1014 (1986); see McIntosh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1164, 1174

(1967).
25. I.R.C. § 1015 (1986); see Sauvigne v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 123, 124
(1971).
26. I.R.C. § 83 (1986); see Sauvigne v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 123, 124 (1971).

27. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1) (1986).
28. Id. § 1367(b). Although the Code fails to specify when the basis adjustment occurs,
the adjustment probably occurs at the end of the corporation's fiscal year. I. GRANT, supra
note 12, § 19.3, at 19-14.
29. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2) (1986).
30. Id. § 1368(b)(1) provides that distributions are tax-free to the extent of the share-
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31
expenses.
B.
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including

nondeductible

Basis of Indebtedness

In addition to the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock, the basis of
indebtedness of the S corporation to the shareholder further restricts the
deductibility of loss and deduction pass-throughs. 32 Indebtedness within the
meaning of the statute is conceptually analogous to actual capital investment. 33 The debt must run directly from the corporation to the
34
shareholder.
Courts have narrowly construed the indebtedness limitation. 35 The Tax
Court has held that indebtedness of a corporation to a partnership owned
identically by the shareholders of the debtor corporation did not increase the
shareholders' debt bases. 36 Similarly, loans from a subchapter C 3 7 corporation to an identically owned S corporation did not generate basis. 38 The Tax
Court has also ruled that loans from an estate to an S corporation did not
39
generate basis to a shareholder who was the sole beneficiary of the estate,
and that notes given by an S corporation to a shareholder for unpaid salary
did not result in an increase in the basis of indebtedness. 4°
As discussed earlier, certain items reduce the basis of the shareholder's
stock. 41 The reduction, however, cannot cause a negative basis. 42 Any excess of these reduction items over the stock basis then reduces the basis of
indebtedness owing to the shareholder, but again, that basis cannot be reduced below zero. 4 3 When the basis of indebtedness is reduced, repayment
of the debt by the corporation results in income to the shareholder equal to
the difference between the amount paid and the basis.44 If the corporation
holder's basis. See Erickson, NonliquidatingS CorporationDistributions,Adjustments Require
Special Considerations,62 J. TAX'N 211, 212-13 (1985) (comparing S corporation and partnership distribution provisions).
31. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2) (1982). The Code does not address the question of basis reduction
when shareholders have various stockholdings with different bases. Under prior law, shareholders reduced basis on a pro rata basis. I. GRANT, supra note 12, § 19.4, at 19-17. The basis
reduction occurred at the close of the corporation's tax year in which the corporation incurred
the losses and deductions. Id. at 19-18.
32. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1)(B) (1986). For text of § 1366(d)(1)(B) see supra note 14.
33. Underwood v. Commissioner, 535 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussion of legislative history to support investment analogy); Neal v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 393, 396 (C.D.
Cal. 1970) (funds must be advanced as if shareholder made additional investment).
34. See Burnstein v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1100, 1103 (1984); Prashker v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 172, 176 (1972).
35. See I. GRANT, supra note 12, § 19.2, at 19-8.
36. Frankel v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 343, 350 (1973); Rev. Rul. 69-125, 1969-1 C.B. 207.
37. I.R.C. §§ 301-386 (1986).
38. Lee v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157, 1159-60 (1976).
39. Prashker v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 172, 176 (1972).
40. Borg v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 257, 262-64 (1968).
41. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
42. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2) (1986).
43. Id. § 1367(b)(2)(A). Current law provides that subsequent income to the corporation
results in restoration of the basis of indebtedness. Id. § 1367(b)(2)(B).
44. Cornelius v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 465, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1974); Barr v. Commis-
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repays the debt in installments, the corporation must proportionately allo45
cate each installment between income and basis restoration.
II.

IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER LOAN GUARANTEES ON BASIS

As small business enterprises, new or existing S corporations often require
substantial debt financing in order to obtain necessary operating capital. Because of the risk element involved in many small corporations, lenders frequently insist that one or more of the shareholders of the S corporation
personally guarantee the debt. If the corporation subsequently incurs net
operating losses, shareholders, attempting to maximize the deduction on
their own tax returns of loss and deduction pass-throughs under section
1366(a), often argue that their personal guarantee of the corporation's loan
serves to increase the basis of indebtedness of the corporation owed to the
shareholder or the basis of the shareholder's stock in the corporation. 46 The
result, the argument goes, is that the increased basis allows a larger passthrough of deductions under section 1366(a).
Supported by a long tradition of case law, courts have generally held that
shareholder loan guarantees do not generate basis for the shareholder in the
S corporation. 47 Courts have adhered to this rule regardless of whether the
sioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 834, 836-37 (1980); Brown v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 886,
889 (1979).
45. Novell v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 92, 93 (1970); Smith v. Commissioner, 48
T.C. 872, 873-75 (1967), aff'd, 424 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1970); Rev. Rul. 64-162, 1964-1 C.B.
304.
46. See I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) (1986).
47. Brown v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 755, 756 (6th Cir. 1983) (shareholders who made
no disbursements on guaranteed corporate loan allowed no basis increase); Underwood v.
Commissioner, 535 F.2d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1976) (court treated exchange of demand notes
between shareholders and their wholly owned corporations as guarantee and disallowed basis
increase); In re Breit, 460 F. Supp. 873, 875-76 (E.D. Va. 1978) (shareholder could not increase basis under former § 1374 when corporation defaulted on guaranteed note); Wheat v.
United States, 353 F. Supp. 720, 722-23 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (guarantees on loans secured by
chattel mortgages did not increase stock basis); Neal v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 393, 396
(C.D. Cal. 1970) (shareholder guarantee and pledge of mortgage and equipment as security did
not constitute indebtedness within meaning of former § 1374(c)(2)); Calcutt v. Commissioner,
84 T.C. 716, 720 (1985) (debts of corporations to third parties, whether collateralized or not,
do not generate stock basis; § 465 at-risk provisions do not affect this issue); Gilday v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295, 1297 (1982) (shareholder could generate basis by substituting own demand note for guaranteed corporate debt); Blackman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1512, 1515 (1981) (shareholder guarantee not recast as either debt or capital contribution); Williams v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 844, 848 (1981) (shareholders who were
comakers on loan with corporation not allowed increase in basis); Albert v. Commissioner, 41
T.C.M. (CCH) 591, 595-96 (1980) (guarantee did not generate basis); Brown v. Commissioner,
38 T.C.M. (CCH) 886, 888 (1979) (shareholder endorsement of corporate loan not equivalent
to advance from shareholder to corporation); Thompson v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
157, 161 (1977) (shareholder guarantee of corporate debt did not increase basis of stock or
debt; mere guarantee not an economic outlay); Duke v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 229,
231 (1976) (shareholder guarantee did not result in economic outlay sufficient to generate basis); Mirow v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 628, 630-31 (1975) (shareholder who was coindemnitor on construction bonds could not increase basis in corporation); Parson v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 789, 792 (1974) (shareholder who did not assume, but merely guaranteed, corporate obligations, could not increase basis), aff'd mem., 554 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir.
1977); Smalley v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 373, 378 (1973) (mere guarantee does not
increase basis); Frankel v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 343, 347 (1973) (denied basis increase when
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shareholder pledged property as security on the loan,4 8 or whether, under
state law, the guarantee resulted in primary or secondary liability to the
shareholder. 49 Moreover, this rule has extended to many types of indirect
borrowing, 50 including suretyship, 5 comaking, 52 co-indemnity, 5 3 and joint
54
and several liability.
Shareholders could generate additional basis simply by borrowing money
themselves and then contributing the money to the corporation." The loan
guarantee problem persists, however, because many shareholders enter into
financing arrangements without first obtaining tax counsel. Although share56
holders who are denied a basis increase may carry over any unused losses

under section 1366(d)(2),

57

this carryover ability remains unacceptable to

many shareholders who seek short-term loss pass-throughs.
partnership owned by shareholders in exact proportion to shareholdings loaned money to corporation), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1974); Estate of Cole v. Commissioner, 32
T.C.M. (CCH) 313, 328 (1973) (shareholder's guarantee did not increase basis); Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436, 438 (1972) (shareholder's guarantee did not represent indebtedness of
the corporation to him or an equity contribution in substance); Prashker v. Commissioner, 59
T.C. 172, 177 (1972) (shareholder could not increase basis when corporation owed money to
estate of which he was sole beneficiary); Raynor v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762, 770-71 (1968)
(guarantee did not increase basis); Borg v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 257, 264-65 (1968) (shareholders could not increase basis when they were sureties and had pledged business and personal assets); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,426,006 (June 29, 1984) (shareholder's primary liability not debt
from corporation until shareholder pays the liability); see Perry v. Commissioner, 392 F.2d
458, 461 (8th Cir. 1968) (since shareholders loaned no money to corporation, no debt existed;
therefore, shareholders denied basis increase); Harrington v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 53, 59
(D. Del. 1985) (shareholders could not increase basis by being comakers on note); Burnstein v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1100, 1105-06 (1984) (shareholders denied increase in basis
to extent corporation borrowed money from another S corporation owned by identical interests); Tuchman v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 192, 195 (1981) (shareholder who made
no payments on guaranteed obligation denied basis increase), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 298 (2d
Cir. 1982); Lord v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 653, 658 (1970) (shareholders could take
loss in year mortgage given by them as security satisfied, not in year in which they guaranteed
corporation's debt).
48. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 720, 721 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (chattel
mortgages); Neal v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 393, 395 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (pledge of mortgage
and equipment); Mirow v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 628, 629 (1975) (construction
bonds); Lord v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 653, 657 (1970) (mortage); Raynor v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762, 765 (1968) (chattel mortgages); Borg v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 257,
262 (1968) (business and personal assets).
49. Neal v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 393, 396 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Estate of Cole v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 313, 328 (1973); Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436, 438 (1972);
Raynor v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762, 770 (1968); Borg v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 257, 264
(1968).
50. Raynor v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762, 770-71 (1968).
51. Borg v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 257, 264-65 (1968) (court treated guarantee as surety
under Oklahoma law).
52. Harrington v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 53, 55 (D. Del. 1985); Williams v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 844, 847 (1981).
53. Mirow v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 628, 629 (1975).
54. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,426,006 (June 29, 1984).
55. Prashker v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 172, 176 (1972).
56. Under prior law, a shareholder who could not generate enough basis to deduct his
entire operating loss lost the deduction forever. Albert v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH)
591, 597 (1980); Plowden v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 666, 671 (1967), aff'd per curiam, 398
F.2d 340, 341 (4th Cir. 1968); cf Byrne v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 151, 158 (1965) (shareholder
who had insufficient stock basis lost excess deduction), aff'd, 361 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1966).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
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Basis of Indebtedness of the Corporation to the Shareholder

The most common argument advanced in favor of increasing the basis of
indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder is that the shareholder's
guarantee represents, in substance if not form, a loan to the shareholder,
followed by a loan from the shareholder to the corporation. A transaction
viewed in this manner, according to shareholders, thus generates basis in
indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder under section
1366(d)(1)(B). 58 Courts, however, have reasoned that guarantees do not
represent indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder within the
meaning of the statute. The legislative history requires that a shareholder
make an investment in the corporation in order to generate basis. 59 Courts
have interpreted the word "investment" as requiring an actual economic
intended debt basis to
outlay by the shareholder, 6° and stated that Congress
61
be conceptually analogous to a capital investment.
Courts have also reasoned that shareholder loan guarantees do not constitute indebtedness within the meaning of section 1366(d)(1)(B) because the
corporation owes nothing directly to the shareholder. 62 Courts have treated
the guarantee as only a contingency that does not become a debt of the corporation until the contingency has happened: 63 the corporation must default
on the loan. Accordingly, a shareholder who ultimately pays the guaranteed
debt receives an increase in basis in the S corporation. 64 This basis increase
occurs in the year the shareholder makes payment; it does not relate back to
the year in which the shareholder guaranteed the corporation's debt. 65
The Sixth Circuit had an opportunity to consider the impact of shareholder loan guarantees on basis in Brown v. Commissioner.66 Like so many
taxpayers before him, the shareholder in Brown argued that his guarantee
constituted, in substance, a loan from the lender to him, followed by an advance of the funds to the corporation. The court, however, refused to accept
58. In virtually all the cases dealing with this argument, former § 1374(c)(2)(B), the predecessor to § 1366(d)(1)(B), applied. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
59. SEN. REP. No. 1983, supra note 17, at 220, 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 5008.
60. See Underwood v. Commissioner, 535 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1976); Thompson v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 157, 161 (1977); Duke v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH)
229, 231 (1976); Perry v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 159, 164 (1966), aff'd on other grounds, 392
F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1968); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,426,006 (June 29, 1984).
61. Underwood v. Commissioner, 535 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1976); Wheat v. United
States, 353 F. Supp. 720, 722 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Neal v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 393, 396
(C.D. Cal. 1970); Frankel v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 343, 349 (1973), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d
1051 (3d Cir. 1974).
62. Frankel v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 343, 347 (1973), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1051 (3d
Cir. 1974); Prashker v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 172, 176 (1972); Perry v. Commissioner, 47
T.C. 159, 163 (1966), aff'd on other grounds, 392 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1968).
63. Neal v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 393, 396 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Borg v. Commissioner,
50 T.C. 257, 265 (1968).
64. Neal v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 393, 396 (C.D. Cal. 1970). This principle is based
on Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 85 (1956), in which the United States Supreme
Court held that when a guarantor performs, the corporation becomes indebted to the
shareholder.
65. Rev. Rul. 71-288, 1971-2 C.B. 319.
66. 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983).
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the shareholder's substance over form argument, stating that the shareholder
67
must accept the tax consequences of the transaction into which he entered.
The court stated that shareholder loan guarantees simply do not meet the
economic outlay requirement of S corporation basis. 68 The court added that
shareholders must make payments
on guaranteed corporate indebtedness
69
before their basis will increase.
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that a shareholder who substituted a personal demand note for a guaranteed corporate loan generated additional basis in the S corporation. In Revenue Ruling 75-14470 a
shareholder, instead of making payment on a guaranteed debt, executed a
personal promissory note and substituted it for the corporation's note. The
bank accepted the substitution of the note and relieved the corporation of
any liability. The taxpayer made no payments until the fourth year following the substitution of notes. These facts raised the question of whether substitution of a shareholder's note for the corporation's guaranteed note
created basis-generating indebtedness within the meaning of former section
1374(c)(2).
The Service ruled that such a substitution generates basis if, under state
law, the corporation's debt to the lender becomes an obligation to the shareholder-guarantor under the doctrine of subrogation. 71 Under subrogation, if
the lender accepts the note in full satisfaction of the corporation's debt, the
guarantor becomes a creditor of the corporation, even if the shareholder
makes no payments on the principal. 72 The substitution therefore generates
73
basis in an amount equal to the face amount of the note given up.
The Tax Court went a step further than Revenue Ruling 75-144 in Gilday
v. Commissioner.74 In Gilday a shareholder-guarantor substituted a personal
note for a guaranteed corporate debt, but subrogation did not occur under
state law. The Tax Court nevertheless held that the corporation became
75
indebted to its shareholders regardless of whether subrogation occurred.
67. Id. at 756. In the court's opinion, the substance of the transaction matched its form.
Id. For a discussion of the substance over form doctrine see infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
68. 706 F.2d at 756. The court stated that without the economic outlay requirement,
taxpayers could circumvent the limitations contained in former § 1374(c) in a way never intended by Congress. Id. The court also dismissed the taxpayer's argument that the guarantee

constituted a contribution to capital. Id. The Tax Court addressed this issue in Blum v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436, 439-40 (1972). For a discussion of Blum see infra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text.
69. 706 F.2d at 752; see Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82, 85 (1956); Neal v. United
States, 313 F. Supp. 393, 396 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
70. 1975-1 C.B. 277. This ruling amplified Rev. Rul. 70-50, 1970-1 C.B. 178, which held
that a shareholder who performs on a guarantee may increase basis in the corporation.
71. 1975-1 C.B. at 278 (relying on Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956); see supra
note 64).
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also J. EUSTICE & J. Kurz, supra note 1, 10.03[2][k], at 10-37 (discussing
alternative ways of viewing the substitution).
74. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (1982).
75. Id. at 1297. The court apparently based its holding upon a finding of fact that the
corporation itself was indebted to the shareholders. For a discussion of Rev. Rul. 75-144 and
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The court therefore allowed the shareholders to increase their bases in the
76
corporation.
The Fifth Circuit reached a contrary result in Underwood v. Commissioner.77 In Underwood a taxpayer owned all the stock in two corporations,
one an S corporation and the other a C corporation. The S corporation had
borrowed money from the other corporation. Needing to generate some basis for purposes of the loss limitation, the taxpayer authorized several transactions. First, the C corporation that had loaned the money surrendered the
notes of the S corporation. Then, the S corporation issued a demand note to
the taxpayer. The taxpayer then gave a personal note to the C corporation.
All the notes contained identical principal amounts. The court treated the
transaction as a guarantee by the taxpayer of the S corporation's debt to the
C corporation. 78 Citing authority holding that mere guarantees do not generate basis, 79 the court held that the taxpayer could not increase basis since
he had made no actual payments on the debt. 80
The court distinguished the Underwood facts from the facts in Revenue
Ruling 75-144 in two ways. The obligee in Revenue Ruling 75-144 was a
bank, whereas Mr. Underwood's creditor was his own corporation.8 1 Unlike
the situation in Revenue Ruling 75-144, no proof existed in Underwood that
the original creditor
would demand from the taxpayer payment of the substi82
tuted note.
B. Basis of Shareholder'sStock in the Corporation
Courts have most frequently disallowed an increase in basis when a shareholder guaranteed a corporate loan on the grounds that the guarantee did
not increase the basis of indebtedness of the S corporation to the shareholder
under section 1366(d)(1)(B) or former section 1374(c)(2). In some cases,
however, taxpayers have argued that the loan guarantee constituted an in83
crease in the basis of the shareholder's stock under section 1366(d)(1)(A).
The Tax Court considered this question in Blum v. Commissioner.84 In
Blum the shareholder personally guaranteed a loan to his solely owned S
corporation and secured the loan with shares of stock that he held in other
corporations. After dismissing the shareholder's argument that the guarantee constituted an addition to debt basis, 8 5 the court turned to the question
Gilday, see Mullaney & Blau, An Analytic Comparison of Partnershipsand S Corps as Vehicles

For Leveraged Investments, 59 J. TAX'N 142, 143-45 (1983).
76. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1297.
77. 535 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1976).
78. Id. at 312.
79. See cases cited supra note 47.
80. 535 F.2d at 312. For a discussion of Underwood see Malloy & Willis, Careful Debt

Planning Can Save Subchapter S Net Operating Loss Passthrough,53 TAXES 373, 375 (1975).
81. 535 F.2d at 312 n.2.
82. Id. For further discussion of Underwood see Note, Underwood v. CommissionerSection 1374(c)(2) and the Actual Investment Limitation on NOL Pass-Through to Subchapter
S Corporation Shareholders,30 TAX LAW. 790 (1977).
83. See Breit v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 873, 875-76 (E.D. Va. 1978).
84. 59 T.C. 436 (1972).
85. Id. at 438 (citing Raynor v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762, 770-71 (1968)).
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of whether the guarantee could be recast as an indirect contribution to capital under the substance over form doctrine.8 6 The court noted that the Commissioner had applied the substance over form argument in the past in
recharacterizing shareholder guaranteed loans as equity investments for the
87
purpose of denying corporations a deduction for interest paid on the loan.
The court stated that although the question of whether guaranteed loans
constitute, in substance, contributions to capital usually arises in the context
of disallowed interest deductions, the answer to the question in the context
of S corporation basis should turn on the same traditional debt-equity principles used in the interest deduction context. 88 Under these principles, the
court concluded that the taxpayer simply had not met his burden of proving
that the loan guarantee should be recharacterized as an equity investment. 89
III.

SELFE V. UNITED STATES

Against a long tradition of case law holding that S corporation shareholder loan guarantees do not generate basis in the corporation, a case finally
appeared that may have signaled the erosion of the traditional rule. In Selfe
v. United States90 the Eleventh Circuit held that a shareholder who guarantees a corporate loan may increase basis in either the stock or the indebtedness of the corporation upon a factual determination by the court that the
guarantee, in substance, constitutes a loan from the lender to the shareholder
that is followed by an advance of the funds from the shareholder to the
corporation. 9 1
In 1977 Jane B. Selfe began a retail clothing business. She applied to a
local bank for financing and, in exchange for financing, she pledged shares of
stock in another corporation. She then incorporated her business and
elected to be taxed under subchapter S of the Code. At the request of the
bank, Mrs. Selfe converted almost all of the debt from herself to the corporation and agreed personally to guarantee the loans. 92 The corporation, seeking a loan renewal from the bank, later granted the bank a security interest
in its inventory, contract rights, and receivables. Upon commencing opera86. Id. at 439.
87. Id.; see infra notes 136-78 and accompanying text.
88. 59 T.C. at 439 (citing Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 550
(1968)).
89. Id. at 440. In denying the stock basis increase, the court provided valuable information on what factors might persuade a court to recast a guarantee as a capital contribution.
Although no single factor is dispositive, relevant factors include: whether the corporation is
thinly capitalized; whether the corporation is insolvent at the time of the loan; whether the
lender expects payment from the corporation, rather than the shareholder; whether the loan
instrument evidences an unconditional obligation to pay a fixed sum; whether the debt bears a
fixed rate of interest payable unconditionally; whether the debt is subordinated; and whether
the debt carries voting rights. Id. at 440-41. For discussion of these factors outside of the S
corporation context see supra text accompanying notes 136-78.
90. 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 772-73.
92. At trial, the bank's loan officer testified that the purpose of the conversion was to
obtain primary liability in the corporation. The conversion, however, altered neither the stock
security nor the bank's right to collect from Mrs. Selfe as guarantor. Id. at 771.
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tions, the corporation experienced losses from 1977 to 1980. The corpora93
tion, however, never defaulted on its loan.
Mrs. Selfe and her husband increased their basis in the corporation by the
amount of the guaranteed debt and deducted the full amount of their net
operating losses under former section 1374(a). 94 The government disallowed
most of the deduction," asserting that the guarantee did not increase the
Selfe's basis in the corporation for purposes of the former section 1374(c) net
operating loss limitation. The Selfes paid the deficiency and sued the United
States for a refund in a federal district court, which granted summary judgment to the United States. 96 The Selfes appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Selfes argued on appeal that the guaranteed loan constituted, in substance, a loan to Mrs. Selfe from the bank that was followed by a capital
contribution to the corporation. The loan thereby increased the basis of
Mrs. Selfe's stock. The Selfes relied heavily on Plantation Patterns,Inc. v.
Commissioner,97 a Fifth Circuit decision holding in a non-S corporation context that a loan is considered as made to a shareholder who guarantees the
loan when the facts demonstrate that the lender looked principally to the
shareholder for repayment. 98 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Selfes
and disagreed with Brown v. Commissioner,99 which held that an S corporation shareholder must actually make payment on debt guaranteed by the
shareholder before a basis increase occurs. 1° °
The court next turned its attention to the Selfe's substance over form argument. The court agreed with the government's assertion that taxpayers
must accept the tax consequences of the transaction into which they have
93. The bank, therefore, never proceeded against the pledged stock or Mrs. Selfe.
94. I.R.C. § 1366(a) (1986) currently allows the pass-through of losses and deductions.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
95. The court only considered the Selfe's 1980 tax liability.
96. The district court, in an unreported decision, relied primarily on Brown v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983). 778 F.2d at 772; see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying
text.
97. 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
98. Id. at 724. PlantationPatterns did not decide whether an S corporation shareholder
could generate basis in the corporation by guaranteeing corporate debt. Rather, that case
determined that a C corporation shareholder's loan guarantee constituted, in substance, an
indirect capital contribution to the corporation, resulting in a denial of the interest deduction
to the corporation and dividend income to the shareholder-guarantor. For a discussion of
Plantation Patterns see infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text. Plantation Patterns was
precedential because the Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent decisions of the Fifth Circuit
rendered prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1 1th Cir.
1981). In Lane v. United States, 742 F.2d 1311, 1320 (1 1th Cir. 1984), the Eleventh Circuit
stated that it would seriously consider the holding in Plantation Patterns when determining
whether a shareholder who advances funds to a corporation has made an indirect capital contribution.
Mrs. Selfe also argued that the loan should be characterized as equity under former Treas.
Reg. § 1.385-9 (1980). The court, however, noted that the IRS withdrew that regulation in
1983. 778 F.2d at 772. For a discussion of Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9 (1980) see infra notes 132-34
and accompanying text.
99. 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983).
100. Id. at 757. The Brown court noted that a guarantor who has pledged stock for a loan
has made an economic outlay, since the stock is no longer available for other investments. Id.
at 756. For a discussion of Brown see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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entered and, thus, may not later argue that the substance of their transaction
should warrant different, presumably more favorable, tax treatment.,' The
court, however, also noted that tax consequences are not always determined
solely by reference to the form of the transaction. 10 2 In other words, the tax
treatment of transactions sometimes follows substance, rather than form.
The court stated that the substance over form doctrine particularly applies
to the question of whether corporate capital is characterized as debt or equity for tax purposes. 10 3 The court noted that the Fifth Circuit, at the Commissioner's request in PlantationPatterns, recharacterized interest payments
on corporate debentures as constructive shareholder dividends.'14 The court
determined that taxpayers, as well as the government, may argue for
recharacterization of debt as equity. 1 5 Section 385 provided the authority
for such recharacterization; it authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
prescribe regulations 10 6 and provided factors to be considered in making the
determination. 107 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit in Lane v. United
States10 8 had developed its own set of thirteen factors to guide courts in
determining whether corporate instruments constitute debt or equity. 1 9
The Selfe court therefore concluded that courts may tax transactions according to their substance when faced with a question concerning the nature of a
taxpayer's interest in a corporation, guided by the factors set forth in section
385 and Lane.110
The Selfe court then returned to a consideration of Mrs. Selfe's loan guarantee. In the court's opinion, taxpayer attempts to generate basis in S corporations by guaranteeing loans failed in the past usually because the taxpayers
could not demonstrate that the substance of the loan guarantee differed from
its form."' The court refused to allow the failure of past taxpayers, however, to translate into a categorical rejection of the recharacterization argument. 112 The court therefore held that a shareholder loan guarantee, in
substance, may be treated as an equity investment in the corporation or as
corporate indebtedness to the shareholder for the purpose of increasing the
shareholder's basis in the S corporation. 113 A taxpayer can prevail by demonstrating that the lender looked primarily to the shareholder for repayment
and that the guarantee constitutes a capital contribution under traditional
101. 778 F.2d at 773 (citing Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co.,
417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974)).
102. Id. (citing Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940)).
103. Id.
104. Id. For a discussion of PlantationPatterns see infra notes 171-78 and accompanying
text.
105. 778 F.2d at 774.

106. I.R.C. § 385(a) (1986).
107. Id. § 385(b).
108. 742 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1984).
109. The Eleventh Circuit developed the thirteen factors by following the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972).
110. See 778 F.2d at 773-74.
111. Id. at 774; see supra text accompanying notes 83-91.
112. 778 F.2d at 774.
113. Id.
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debt-equity principles. 11 4 The court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment for the United States and remanded the case to the
district court.' 1 5

IV.

RECHARACTERIZATION OF THE LOAN GUARANTEE
AS AN EQUITY INVESTMENT

The court's holding in Setfe rested on precedential cases outside the scope
of subchapter S in which courts recast loan guarantees as indirect capital
contributions. 1 6 Thus, a proper understanding of Selfe requires an analysis
of the following: (1) debt-equity principles; (2) circumstances under which
courts have recharacterized guarantees as indirect capital contributions in
non-subchapter S settings; and (3) the substance versus form doctrine.
A.

Debt-Equity Principles

Much litigation has surrounded attempts to determine whether corporate
securities constitute, in substance, debt or equity for purposes of federal taxation.1 1 7 A typical scenario involves shareholders' advancing funds to a corporation under the rubric of indebtedness, but utilizing debt instruments
that contain equity features. For example, a corporation might issue to
shareholders debentures that are convertible into preferred stock at a given
time.' 1 8 If the security is classified as debt, the corporation may deduct interest payments," 9 and the shareholder includes in income that portion of
the payment representing interest.' 20 If a court classifies the security as equity, however, the corporation loses the interest deduction' 2 ' and the shareholder must include the full payment as dividend income. 2 2 Thus,
taxpayers usually argue for classification of the security as debt. 123 The typical debt-equity dispute does not involve the question of whether a shareholder loan guarantee constitutes an equity investment for purposes of S
corporation basis, as in Se/fe. Nevertheless, traditional debt-equity princi124
ples govern the shareholder loan guarantee question.
114. Id. at 774-75.
115. Id. at 775.
116. See supra notes 98-109 and accompanying text. The court relied principally on Plantation Patterns.
117. For a detailed discussion of the debt-equity controversy see Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of CorporateDebt: A CriticalAnalysis and a Proposal,26 TAX L. REV.
369 (1971).
118.

See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS

AND SHAREHOLDERS 4.06, at 4-17 to -21 (abr. 4th ed. 1979).
119. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1986).
120. Id. § 61(a)(4).
121. The Internal Revenue Code currently allows corporations no deduction for dividends
paid.
122. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (1986). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminates the dividend exclusion for individuals, effective December 31, 1986. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11-162 (1986).
123. B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 118, T 4.02, at 4-5.
124. Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 534-35 (1st Cir. 1976); Plantation Patterns, 462 F.2d at 719; Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 189, 198 (1971); Santa
Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 436, 550 (1968).
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Courts have traditionally determined whether a given corporate security
constituted debt or equity on an ad hoc basis. 125 Courts have generally used
enumerated factors in making the determination. 126 No single factor controls the determination.' 27 Since the outcome rests on a case-by-case factual
determination, predictions based on existing case law8 are dangerous, and
12

trial court determinations are not easily overturned.
In response to the confusion generated by debt-equity litigation, Congress
added section 385 to the Code with the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of

1969.129 Section 385(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corpora-

tion constitutes stock or indebtedness for tax purposes. 130 Section 385(b)
lists five nonexclusive factors to guide the Secretary in promulgating regulations. 13 1 In 1980 the Secretary promulgated final regulations for section
385.132 Regulation 1.385-9 specifically addressed the question of shareholder loan guarantees, stating that if the loan is treated as made to the

shareholder under relevant legal principles, then the shareholder is treated as
making a contribution to the capital of the corporation. 133 This regulation
would greatly benefit S corporation shareholders who guarantee corporate
125. E.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946) (securities cast as
debt because of promise to pay a certain annual amount, priority of debentures over common
stock, assignability of debentures, and definite maturity date); Lundgren v. Commissioner, 376
F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1967) (majority shareholder's advances to corporation bona fide debt
based upon parties' intent, conventional nature of promissory note, nonsubordination of debt,
and no alteration in shareholder's proportional ownership); Adams v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.
41, 56 (1972) (short-term debt treated as bona fide indebtedness because of parties' intent,
unqualified promise to pay on a definite date, fixed interest rate, and lack of substantial risk).
126. For example, the Ninth Circuit uses an 11-factor analysis, see O.H. Kruse Grain &
Milling v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 123, 125-26 (9th Cir. 1960), while the Eleventh Circuit
utilizes a 13-factor analysis, see Lane v. United States, 742 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (11th Cir.
1984).
127. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946).
128. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 118, 4.02, at 4-6 to -7.
129. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 487, 613-14.
130. I.R.C. § 385(a) (1986).
131. Id. § 385(b) states:
(b) Factors. The regulations prescribed under this section shall set forth factors which are to be taken into account in determining with respect to a particular fact situation whether a debtor-creditor relationship exists or a corporationshareholder relationship exists. The factors so set forth in the regulations may
include among other factors:
(1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand
or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate
consideration in money or money's worth, and to pay a fixed rate of
interest,
(2) whether there is subordination to or preference over any indebtedness of the corporation,
(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation,
(4) whether there is convertibility into the stock of the corporation, and
(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation and
holdings of the interest in question.
132. T.D. 7747, 1981-1 C.B. 141. For a detailed discussion of the proposed regulations, see
Natbony, Cleaning the Augean Stables.- The Debt-Equity Regulations, 8 J. CORP. TAX'N 3
(1981).
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-9 (1980) (withdrawn 1983).
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loans and then seek basis generation. In 1983, however, the Secretary withdrew the section 385 regulations. 34 Presumably, courts must return to the
inexact case-by-case factual determinations that existed before the section
385 regulations.

1 35

B. Non-SubchapterS Cases
In Selfe the Eleventh Circuit based its holding on Plantation Patterns,
which recharacterized a shareholder loan guarantee as an indirect contribution to capital. 1 36 PlantationPatterns,however, did not concern an S corporation shareholder's attempt to generate basis by guaranteeing a corporate
loan. Rather, the case involved the question of whether a C corporation
could deduct interest payments made on the corporate debt and whether the
shareholders had resulting dividend income. A proper analysis of Selfe,
therefore, requires an understanding of cases outside the scope of subchapter
S that have considered137whether guarantees, in substance, constituted indirect
capital contributions.

Courts have stated that this question turns on traditional debt-equity principles. 138 The outcome of a particular case depends heavily on the facts of
the case. 139 The time for judging the efficacy of the guarantee is at its
0
inception. 14
Courts have dealt with the question of whether a guaranteed corporate
loan should be recast as a loan to the shareholder, followed by a capital
contribution to the corporation, in cases considering a variety of tax consequences. These consequences have included whether the corporation could
deduct interest payments and, therefore, whether the shareholder had dividend income. 141 Other cases have involved: whether payments on a guaran134. T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69.
135. B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 118, 4.05 n.45, at S4-7 (Supp. 1984).
136. Plantation Patterns,462 F.2d at 722-23.
137. See generally Holzman, The Current Trend in Guaranty Cases: An Impetus to ThinIncorporation?,11 TAX. L. REV. 29, 44-50 (1955) (relating guarantee transaction area to area
of thin incorporations); New Thin Incorporation Threat: Repayment of Guaranteed Bank
Loans Treatedas Dividends, 23 J. TAX'N 197, 197-99 (1965) (exploring the limits of loan guar-

antee recharacterization in light of Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222 (9th
Cir. 1967)).
138. E.g., Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 534-35 (1st Cir. 1976)
(advance by stockholder to corporation during corporation's financial difficulty deemed equity); PlantationPatterns,462 F.2d at 718 (stockholder guarantee deemed capital contribution
because funds used to purchase corporate assets, stockholder exercised complete corporate
control, and corporation was thinly capitalized); Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner,
50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968) (Commissioner's request to recast guaranteed corporate debt as equity
refused; debt instruments evidenced unconditional payment obligation and fixed interest rate;
debt was unsubordinated and carried no voting rights).
139. E.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946); Estate of Mixon v.
United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972); Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner,
50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968).
140. Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968).
141. Plantation Patterns, 462 F.2d at 717-18 (guarantee held a capital contribution; therefore, corporation could not deduct interest and shareholder had dividend income); Murphy
Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1967) (guarantee held genuine debt);
Ackerson v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 475, 478 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (guarantee treated as debt);
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teed debt resulted in an ordinary or a capital loss; 142 whether cancellation of
the alleged indebtedness by the shareholder gave rise to taxable income to
the corporation; 143 whether the guarantee destroyed the status of the corporation's stock as small business stock under section 1244; 144 and whether

payments from an acquiring corporation to an acquired corporation to pay
off the guaranteed debt in a section 368(c) corporate reorganization resulted
in taxable gain to the shareholder. 14 5
Courts have cited various factors in making the classification decision.
Some courts have classified the guaranteed debt as genuine indebtedness
when the debt instrument contained a fixed maturity date 46 and fixed rate
of interest, 147 when the corporation made actual payments on the debt, 14 8
and when valid business reasons existed for making the guarantee. 149 Courts
have also reasoned that adequate collateral securing the debt corroborated a

finding that the guarantee constituted debt. 150 The Tax Court has added that
intent to create a valid indebtedness, use of the entire loan proceeds by the
corporation, a custom of shareholder guarantees, and a lack of participation

by the lender in the affairs of the corporation support treatment of the guarantee as debt. 15 1

In classifying loan guarantees as indirect capital contributions rather than
debt, courts have looked to such factors as exercise of managerial control by
the guarantor, 152 common identity of shareholder and guarantor,153 use of a
substantial portion of the borrowed funds to purchase capital assets,' 154 and
an absence of written evidences of indebtedness. 155 Thin capitalization of
the corporation has also provided strong impetus for equity treatment. 156 In
Fors Farms, Inc. v. United States, 66-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9206 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 1966)
(guaranteed debt held bona fide indebtedness).
142. Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 535 (1st Cir. 1976) (capital
loss); Hunter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 385 (1982) (capital loss); Santa Anita Consol, 50 T.C. at 562 (capital loss). If the court recasts the guarantee as a capital contribution,
the shareholder must deduct a capital loss under § 165(g). If the guarantee is treated as debt,
the shareholder may take an ordinary loss deduction under § 165(a) or § 166(a)(1).
143. J.A. Maurer, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1273, 1291 (1958) (guarantee held to be
equity; no taxable income to petitioner corporation).
144. Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 189, 199 (1971) (court's treatment of guarantee as
debt allowed § 1244 loss).
145. Rev. Rul. 79-4, 1979-1 C.B. 150 (treatment of guarantee as equity resulted in gain to
acquired corporation's shareholder).
146. E.g., Ackerson v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 475, 477 (W.D. Ky. 1967); Smyers, 57
T.C. at 198; Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968).
147. E.g., Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 532 (1st Cir. 1976);
Smyers, 57 T.C. at 198; Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968).
148. See Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 553 (1968).
149. See Ackerson v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 475, 477 (W.D. Ky. 1967); Santa Anita
Consol., 50 T.C. at 550-51.
150. Ackerson v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 475, 477 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (20% security
margin considered adequate).
151. Fors Farms, Inc. v. United States, 66-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9206, at 85,359 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 17, 1966).
152. PlantationPatterns,462 F.2d at 722; see infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
153. PlantationPatterns,462 F.2d at 722.
154. Id.; Hunter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 385, 390 (1982).
155. Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 532 (1st Cir. 1976).
156. PlantationPatterns,462 F.2d at 722; Hunter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 385,
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assessing capitalization, courts often look to the corporation's debt-equity
ratio. The Fifth Circuit recast a guarantee as equity when the corporation
had a 125:1 debt-equity ratio. 157 The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to
give equity treatment to a guaranteed note when the corporation's debt-equity ratio exceeded this figure. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning was that intangible assets, such as the business or financial skills of the shareholderguarantor, must affect the debt-equity analysis.' 58 The Fifth Circuit, however, has declined to consider such intangible assets when assessing the ratio
of debt to equity. 159
Other factors may play a role in the analysis. For example, subordination
of the debt to other corporate debts may result in equity classification. 160
161
Courts have also considered whether the debt carried voting rights,
whether the bank looked primarily to the corporation or to the shareholder
for repayment, 62 and whether the lender would have made the loan absent a
163
shareholder guarantee.
The Ninth Circuit declined to recast a shareholder loan guarantee as an
equity investment in Murphy Logging Co. v. United States.164 The Murphy
brothers owned a partnership and a corporation. The partnership owned
logging equipment and leased the equipment to the corporation. The corporation contracted to cut timber for the Crown-Zellerbach Corporation.
Upon renewal of the contract with Crown-Zellerbach, the Murphys formed
a new corporation. The Murphys nominally capitalized the new corporation 165 and decided that the corporation would purchase the logging equipment from the partnership. In order to make this purchase, the corporation
borrowed the necessary funds from a bank, and the Murphys individually
guaranteed the note. The government argued that the transaction should be
treated as a loan from the bank to the Murphys, followed by an investment
of the funds by the Murphys in the corporation.16 6 This rubric would have
resulted in dividend income to the Murphys equal to the purchase price of
67
the equipment. 1
390 (1982); see Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 532 (lst Cir. 1976);
Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968).
157. Plantation Patterns,462 F.2d at 722.

158. Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1967); see also
Ackerson v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 475, 477-78 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (court considered success and efficient operation of management).
159. Plantation Patterns,462 F.2d at 723.

160. See Ackerson v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 475, 477 (W.D. Ky. 1967); J.A. Maurer,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1273, 1291 (1958).

161. Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 189, 198 (1971); Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 550 (1968).
162. Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 189, 198 (1971).
163. Id. at 199; Santa Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 552-53 (1968).
164. 378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967).
165. Each brother contributed $500 for a total of $1500.
166. The court noted that the Murphys undoubtedly intended through the purchase to step
up the basis of the machinery and begin depreciation deductions again. 378 F.2d at 223. This
intention, however, did not trouble the court. Id.
167. The government also argued for recharacterization of the purchase as a tax-free exchange, which would have resulted in disallowance of stepped-up basis for depreciation purposes. Id. at 224.

1987]

COMMENTS

1259

The court refused to recast the loan guarantee as an equity investment,
stating that looking solely at the nominal stated capital of the corporation
would oversimplify the analysis.' 68 The court stated that the Murphys' contribution of the anticipation of future business from Zellerbach as well as
their own reputation for good business practices prevented the corporation
from being considered thinly capitalized. 169 The court therefore treated the
guarantee as bona fide indebtedness
of the corporation, rather than an indi1 70
rect contribution to capital.
Of course, the PlantationPatternscase involved shareholder loan guarantees. In PlantationPatternsThomas E. and William Jernigan were the principal owners of the petitioner's predecessor, Old Plantation, which operated
a wrought iron furniture business and an office chair business. Desiring to
sell the wrought iron furniture business, the Jernigans located a buyer in Mr.
Jemison, an experienced investment banker who owned Jemison Investment
Company. Mr. Jemison formed Plantation Patterns, Inc.' 71 Plantation Patterns, Inc. then contracted to purchase all of Old Plantation's stock from the
Jernigans, who would then repurchase the office chair business.
The stock purchase price, $893,314.17, which equaled the net worth of
Old Plantation plus $644,909.53, consisted of the following: (1) $100,000
cash; (2) an amount equal to the office chair business, $183,435.84, payable
in three equal interest-free installments; and (3) the balance, $609,878.33,
payable in equal installments. Mr. Jemison and Jemison Investment Company guaranteed the note representing payment for the balance. Part of this
amount, $100,000, was unsubordinated, but the remainder was partially
subordinated. 172
The Fifth Circuit affirmed as not clearly erroneous the Tax Court's finding
that the note represented an indirect equity investment in the corporation by
Mr. Jemison.173 The court relied principally on the fact that the petitioner
had used the majority of the debt to purchase capital assets, as opposed to
using the funds to finance the venture. ' 74 The court also based its holding
on the corporation's thin capitalization, the fact that the sellers agreed to
partial subordination of the note only because of Mr. Jemison's guarantee,
the exercise of total managerial control by Mr. Jemison, and the identity of
interest between the shareholder and the guarantor. 175 In short, the guarantee allowed Mr. Jemison to create borrowing power for the corporation that
it would ordinarily lack absent more adequate capitalization. 176 The court
168. Id.

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The corporation issued all its stock to Mrs. Jemison in exchange for a $5000
contribution.
172. The note was subordinated to all indebtedness of the corporation except a debt owed
to a finance company.

173. 462 F.2d at 724.
174. Id. at 722.
175. Id. Although Mrs. Jemison was the sole shareholder, facts demonstrated that Mr.

Jemison completely controlled the corporation. Id.
176. Id. at 722-23.
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regarded as insignificant the fact that Plantation Patterns, Inc. enjoyed
smooth progress and paid its debts; the time for judging the transaction was
at its inception.1 7 7 The court also refused to consider Mr. Jemison's financial skills as an intangible asset in assessing the corporation's debt-equity
ratio. 178
C. Substance Versus Form
The question of whether a loan guarantee should be recast as an indirect
capital contribution also raises the highly fact-sensitive issue of substance
versus form. 179 The relevant question is whether a court should peer beyond
the form of a transaction and tax the parties according to the underlying
substance of the transaction, or whether a court should tax parties according
to the form of the transaction that the parties freely chose. The United
States Supreme Court has supported both methods of treatment.
The Court rejected the taxpayer's substance over form argument in Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co. 180 Pursuant to a
plan of reorganization, the corporation issued fifty-dollar face value, fivepercent debentures in exchange for its own fifty-dollar par value, five-percent
preferred shares. At the time, the shares were quoted at thirty-three dollars
per share on the over-the-counter market. The corporation claimed amortization deductions equal to the difference between the face value of the debentures and the quoted price of the preferred shares under section 163(a) of
the Code. This section allows as interest deductions original-issue discount
when an issuer sells debentures on the market for a cash price less than the
face amount of the debentures.' 8 1 Although the corporation had issued the
debentures in exchange for its own stock, the corporation urged the Court to
treat the transaction, in substance, as an issuance of the debentures for cash,
followed by a purchase of the preferred shares with the hypothetical cash.
The Court rejected this argument, stating that taxpayers must face the tax
consequences of events that actually occurred, not events that might have
occurred.' 82 The Court's rationale essentially centered on the corporation's
177. Id. at 723. At its inception, the corporation's business prospects looked questionable.

Id.

178. Id. The court, however, stated that an intangible asset might affect the debt-equity
ratio if the asset has a direct and primary relationship to the corporation's success. Id.
179. See generally Donaldson, When Substance-Over-Form Argument Is Available to the
Taxpayer, 9 TAX COUNS. Q. 311 (1965) (explaining situations in which taxpayers can prevail
using the substance over form doctrine); Comment, Substance Versus Form in the Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, 1967 U. ILL. L. REV. 816 (explaining most significant substance over form cases).
180. 417 U.S. 134 (1974).
181. Section 163(a) provides for a deduction for the interest paid or accrued within the
taxable year. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1986). The Court had previously established that the interest
deduction includes debt discount. Helvering v. Union Pac. R.R., 293 U.S. 282, 287 (1934).
182. 417 U.S. at 148; see also Strick Corp. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1194, 1204-07 (3d Cir.
1983) (sale of equipment to related corporation held a taxable event); St. Louis Bank for Coops. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1041, 1052 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (interest received by nonexempt
cooperative corporation on demand deposits held deductible as patronage source income because income derived from management of surplus funds directly related to services to corporation's members).
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failure to prove that it could have purchased its outstanding preferred stock
on the open market; 183 the Court refused 8to4 speculate for what price the
debentures and the stock would have sold.'
The Court allowed the substance over form doctrine to prevail in the
landmark case of Gregory v. Helvering.185 The petitioner was the sole owner
of United Mortgage Corporation, which held 1000 shares of stock in another
corporation. Desiring to bail out the stock with minimum tax consequences,
the petitioner formed another corporation, Averill Corporation. Three days
after the formation of Averill, United Mortgage transferred to Averill the
1000 shares of stock and issued to the petitioner all the shares in Averill.
Averill then dissolved and distributed the 1000 shares to the petitioner, who
sold the stock at favorable capital gain rates. The petitioner argued that the
transfer of the stock from United Mortgage to Averill constituted a tax-free
reorganization. The Court collapsed all the transactions and upheld the
Commissioner's position that the transactions constituted, in substance, a
dividend of the 1000 shares of stock to petitioner. 186 The Court stated that
device to reduce tax liability and escape
the taxpayer had contrived a mere
187
the reality of the transactions.
V.

IMPLICATIONS, ANALYSIS, AND PROPOSAL

A.

Implications of Selfe

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Selfe has several significant implications. Selfe affirmatively stated that an S corporation shareholder may,
under certain circumstances, increase basis by personally guaranteeing corporate debt. 188 Many of the cases preceding Selfe paid lip service to recasting the guarantee as an indirect capital contribution, but none of those cases
actually allowed a basis increase. 189 Moreover, Selfe provided guidelines for
determining whether the loan guarantee actually constitutes a capital contribution. 190 Selfe also held that the district court could, on remand, recast the
guarantee as either an equity investment in, or a shareholder loan to, the
corporation. 19 1 This view expanded the precedent on which the Eleventh
Circuit relied, since the precedent treated guarantees as equity investments
only.' 92 Selfe's creation of a factual test will no doubt send tax practitioners
183. 417 U.S. at 150.
184. Id.
185. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See generally Holzman, Tax Classics, 26 TAXES 454, 454-56
(1948) (discussing ramifications of Gregory).
186. 293 U.S. at 469-70.
187. Id.
188. 778 F.2d at 775.
189. See cases cited supra note 47.
190. Those guidelines involve a factual determination of whether the lender looked primarily to the shareholder for repayment and whether the guarantee constitutes an equity investment under traditional debt-equity principles. 778 F.2d at 775. For a more detailed
explanation see supra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
191. 778 F.2d at 775.
192. In all of the non-subchapter S cases, the Commissioner sought reclassification of the
guarantee as an indirect capital contribution. See supra notes 136-78 and accompanying text.
No non-subchapter S case has considered whether the substance over form doctrine should

1262

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

scrambling to devise creative arguments for defeating the Commissioner at
the trial level.
Aside from the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit may host some interesting litigation as well. The Eleventh Circuit relied primarily on the Fifth
Circuit's decision in PlantationPatternsin holding that a guarantee may be
recast as a capital contribution. 193 The Fifth Circuit has never considered
whether a loan guarantee increases basis in an S corporation. Since the Eleventh Circuit is bound by Fifth Circuit decisions rendered prior to October 1,
1981,194 tax attorneys arguing in the Fifth Circuit will no doubt begin arguing that the Eleventh Circuit logically extended Fifth Circuit precedent in a
manner that the Fifth Circuit should readily endorse.
B.

Analysis and Proposal

Congress should enact legislation allowing shareholders of S corporations
95
to increase their basis in the corporation under certain circumstances.
The substance over form doctrine should apply to recast S corporation loan
guarantees as equity investments, just as the doctrine applies to recast guarantees as equity in non-subchapter S cases. No valid reasons exist for applying the substance over form doctrine in one instance and not in the other.
Since the two scenarios involve the same factual setting, justice requires allowing shareholders to argue the doctrine, just as the Commissioner has successfully argued the doctrine in the past. 196 Selfe logically extends existing
case law in this area.
The recommended legislation should incorporate the Selfe tests for determining when a guarantee, in substance, results in an increase in stock basis.
Selfe states that basis increase results when shareholders demonstrate that
the lender looked primarily to the shareholders for repayment, and when
traditional debt-equity principles favor recharacterization of the guarantee
as a capital contribution. 19 7 By applying debt-equity principles, coupled
with an examination of the lender's intent, no doubts will exist concerning
the true nature of the guarantee. Moreover, these tests reduce the possibility
of tax abuse, since a court may readily examine the lender's intention by way
of direct testimony. The tests also allow the courts the flexibility of applying
their own established debt-equity principles. 198 Should the Secretary of the
apply to view the guarantee as a loan from the bank to the shareholder, followed by a loan
from the shareholder to the corporation.
193. 778 F.2d at 774.
194. After being split off from the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding
precedent Fifth Circuit decisions rendered prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207-08 (11th Cir. 1981).
195. At least one author has advocated legislation allowing basis increase when shareholders guarantee corporate debt. See I. GRANT, supra note 12, § 19.7, at 19-24.
196. The Commissioner, rather than taxpayers, has most often relied on the substance over
form doctrine in arguing that loan guarantees should be recharacterized as capital contributions. See PlantationPatterns,462 F.2d at 721; Murphy Logging Co., 378 F.2d at 224; Santa
Anita Consol., Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 536, 548 (1968). But see J.A. Maurer, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1273, 1289 (1958) (petitioner-corporation urged recharacterization).
197. 778 F.2d at 774-75.
198. The federal circuits have developed their own sets of factors for determining whether
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Treasury promulgate new debt-equity regulations,1 99 the tests could easily
adapt to such regulations.
Selfe also correctly states that the basis of indebtedness of the corporation
to the shareholder should increase when facts demonstrate that the guarantee resembles a loan from the bank to the shareholder that is followed by a
loan from the shareholder to the corporation. 2° This view comports with
the spirit, although not the letter, of section 1366(d)(1)(B). Congress intended the subchapter S loss limitation to be the theoretical equivalent of an
investment in the corporation,20 1 whether the shareholder chose to accept
the stock of the corporation under section 1366(d)(1)(A) or the corporation's
debt under section 1366(d)(1)(B). 20 2 Courts have interpreted this legislative
20 3
intent so as to require that an economic outlay precede basis generation.
When a shareholder pledges assets as security for the guaranteed loan, the
shareholder loses the availability of those assets as collateral for other investments. The shareholder thus loses the time value or use of the collateral.
The shareholder also forgoes potential earnings on an additional investment
that could be made absent the pledge. Under these circumstances the shareholder does, in fact, experience an economic outlay. The shareholder has
thus made the requisite investment in connection with the corporation, in
2 4
the form of forgone revenue, time value, and use of collateral. 0
Allowing basis generation in indebtedness when a shareholder guarantees
corporate debt would also further harmonize S corporation provisions with
partnership provisions, an announced goal of the Subchapter S Revision Act
of 1982.205 Allowing basis increase also would remove another trap for unwary shareholders who, had they retained tax counsel, simply would have
restructured the transaction by personally borrowing funds, then loaning the
funds to the corporation. Congress clearly intended to remove harsh traps
for unwary taxpayers from the purview of subchapter S.206
The Se/fe decision was not correct in all respects, however. Although the
Se/fe court correctly stated that debt-equity principles should control in determining an increase in stock basis, the court illogically reasoned that the
corporate debt constitutes debt or equity for tax purposes. See supra notes 117-35 and accompanying text.
199. The 1980 Treasury Regulations establishing national debt-equity guidelines were
withdrawn in 1983. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text. Some commentators have
suggested that Congress may altogether scrap the notion of establishing national debt-equity
guidelines and repeal § 385. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 118, 4.05, at S4-10 (Supp.
1984).

200. 778 F.2d at 774.
201. S. REP. No. 1983, supra note 17, at 220, 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
5008.
202. J. EUSTICE & J. KUNTZ, supra note 1, 10.01, at 10-2.
203. See Underwood v. Commissioner, 535 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1976); Thompson v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 157, 161 (1977); Duke v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH)
229, 231 (1976); Pelly v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 159, 164 (1966); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,426,006
(June 29, 1984).

204. The Eleventh Circuit voiced similar views. See Selfe, 778 F.2d at 772-73 n.7.
205. S. REP. No. 640, supra note 18, at 6, 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
3258.
206. Id.
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same debt-equity principles should be used to test a potential increase in the
basis of indebtedness. 20 7 Indebtedness, unlike stock, is simply not equity to
which guaranteed debt can be converted. Moreover, unlike using debtequity principles to test for increase in stock basis, extension of20debt-equity
8
principles to basis of indebtedness lacks precedential authority.
A proper set of requirements for testing addition to the basis of indebtedness would first require that the shareholder adequately secure the debt with
collateral. This requirement would insure that the transaction meets the
economic outlay requirement of S corporation basis. A second requirement
should be that the shareholder guaranteed the debt at the request of the
lender. This requirement would preclude shareholders from obtaining a basis increase by volunteering a guarantee when the lender would not otherwise require one. Congress also should require that the guarantee result in
absolute, or unconditional, liability 20 9 to the shareholder under the terms of
2 10
the guarantee contract, or under applicable state law, whichever applies.
Any basis increase requires a firm dollar figure for purposes of computing
the loss limitation. Shareholders who have unconditional liability can affix a
dollar amount on the value of the guarantee for which they are economically
at risk. If the guarantee is not absolute, the dollar value of the guarantee is
not readily ascertainable, since state law or the guarantee contract may first
require the creditor to proceed against the principal debtor. Finally, for a
shareholder guarantee to increase the basis of indebtedness, the guaranteed
debt should be of a type that would generate basis under partnership provisions. This requirement would preclude shareholders from receiving tax
treatment more favorable than partnership provisions would allow. For example, partnership provisions disallow basis increase for secondary liability
21 2
of the partnership 211 and for nonrecourse liabilities of the partnership.
207. 778 F.2d at 774-75. For purposes of the loss limitation of § 1366(d), distinguishing
stock basis and indebtedness basis is insignificant. Other tax consequences, however, demonstrate the need for specifying whether the guarantee constitutes an addition to stock basis or an
addition to the basis of indebtedness. For example, repayment of debt by the corporation to
the shareholder results in income to the shareholder if such basis has been previously reduced.

Rev. Rul. 64-162, 1964-1 C.B. 304. Whether the guarantee increases stock basis or indebtedness basis can therefore affect the amount of income to the shareholder. For a discussion of
the consequences of repayment of debts to shareholder-creditors, see J. EUSTICE & J. KUNTZ,
supra note 1, 9.08.
208. The precedents in this area applied debt-equity principles to determine whether to
recast a guarantee as a capital contribution. See supra notes 136-78 and accompanying text.
No case has applied debt-equity principles to determine whether to recast a guarantee as a loan
from the shareholder to the corporation.
209. If the guarantee is unconditional or absolute, the shareholder's liability depends only
upon the default of the principal debtor. 38 AM. JuR. 2D Guaranty § 21 (1968). Liability
under a conditional guarantee arises only upon the happening of some event other than the
principal debtor's default. Id.
210. In some states, such as California, a guarantor's liability is presumed unconditional by
statute. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2806 (West 1974). That statute addresses suretyship, but § 2787 of
the California Code abolishes guarantee-suretyship distinctions. Id. § 2787. Absent a state
statute, the triggering of the guarantor's liability depends upon the construction of the guarantee contract. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Guaranty § 108 (1968).
211. A partner's contribution of encumbered property does not result in partnership liability that would increase the partners' bases. I.R.C. § 752(a) (1986). Similarly, partners do not
receive increased basis when the partnership is a guarantor or a surety for the liabilities of
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The overall effect of the foregoing suggestions would harmonize the economic outlay requirement for basis generation with the announced goal of
closing the gap between subchapter S provisions and partnership provisions.
An amended section 1366(d) incorporating the recommendations might resemble the following (proposal in italics):
(d) Special rules for losses and deductions.
(1) Cannot exceed shareholder's basis in stock and debt. The aggregate amount of losses and deductions taken into account by a shareholder under subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed the
sum of(A) the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock in the S corporation. .. ,and
(B) the shareholder's adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the S
corporation to the shareholder ....
(4) Shareholderloan guarantees. A shareholderwho guaranteesdebt
of the S corporation shall increase the basis of(A) stock specified in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) of this
subsection, if the guarantee constitutes, in substance, a contribution to the capital of the S corporation, demonstrated if(i) the lender looked primarily to the shareholderfor repayment
of the debt at the time of the guarantee;and
(ii) the guarantee would be considered an equity investment in
the corporation under applicable debt-equity principles; or
(B) indebtedness of the corporation specified in subparagraph (B)
of paragraph (1) of this subsection, if(i) the shareholderpledges adequate collateral as security for
the debt;
(ii) the shareholder guaranteed the debt at the request of the
lender,
(iii) the guaranteeis absolute, or unconditional,according to the
guarantee contract or applicable state law, if any; and
(iv) the debt would result in increased basis under applicable
partnershipprovisions.
(5) Guaranteedefined. The term guaranteeshall include, but not be
limited to, suretyship, comaking, indemnity, and indorsement
arrangements.
(6) Authority to prescribe regulations. The Secretary shall prescribe
such regulations as are necessary to determine whether a shareholder has pledged adequate collateral as security for the guaranteed debt under subparagraph (B)(i) of paragraph (4) of this
subsection.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Internal Revenue Code limits losses and deductions that pass through
others. W.

MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS

AND PARTNERS

7.01[4] (abr. ed. 1978).

212. The at-risk provisions of § 465 limit the partnership loss limitation to amounts for
which partners are personally liable. I.R.C. § 465(b)(1)(A) (1986).
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to S corporation shareholders by the sum of the adjusted basis in the shareholder's stock and the adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the corporation
to the shareholder. Shareholders who guarantee debt of their S corporations
have long argued unsuccessfully that their guarantee should increase their
basis in the corporation. In December 1985 the Eleventh Circuit, citing
Fifth Circuit precedent, decided Selfe v. United States and held that a shareholder who guarantees corporate debt may increase basis in either stock or
indebtedness if the lender primarily looked to the shareholder for repayment
for debt, and if application of traditional debt-equity principles would reveal
that the guarantee constituted a capital contribution in substance. Selfe's
holding is well reasoned with respect to equity, but precedent does not support Selfe's conclusion with respect to indebtedness. Still, valid reasons exist
for allowing an increase in basis of indebtedness when the guarantee arrangement meets certain requirements. These requirements are that the shareholder pledge adequate collateral for the debt, that the shareholder
guarantee the debt at the request of the lender, that the guarantee be absolute or unconditional, and that that the debt would result in increased basis
under partnership provisions. Congress should amend section 1366(d) of the
Internal Revenue Code to incorporate the foregoing suggestions.

